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the court again on the defendant's objection that Louisiana Civil
Code Article 167 limiting personal service contracts to a maxi-
mum term of five years absolved him from the contract. The
court's view was that the mentioned article was not applicable
because the contract was not one of personal service but was in
the nature of a joint enterprise. It further found that the issu-
ance of an injunction restraining conduct contrary to the contract
'would not compel the defendant to render personal services in




The occasion has been taken in previous observations' to
comment upon the manner in which code provisions on servi-
tudes have been getting twisted to cover situations for which
they are not pertinent. While great commendation is due to
the courts for the results they have accomplished in working out
a system of legal standards for the regulation of the oil and gas
industry in Louisiana, great care must be exercised to prevent
the distortion of the basic code provisions in their original con-
text.
In the absence of statutes, the courts have had to make all
the policy determinations, and in working out such decisions of
policy for problems of mineral rights, they are certainly justified
in using whatever basic materials are available for purposes of
analogy and whatever judicial techniques are available for the
accomplishment of the desired results. However, there is no jus-
tification in this process for taking code articles and turning them
inside out so as to read into them, as matters of general interpre-
tation, meanings and rules which are not there and which fur-
thermore are alien and contrary to the fundamental principles of
the articles as they are basically intended to apply to servitudes.
The question of the divisibility of a mineral servitude, as de-
cided in the cases of Ohio Oil Company v. Ferguson2 and Byrd
v. Forgotson,3 has been discussed extensively elsewhere in this
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term (1947) 7 LOUSIANA LAW
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Review.4 The critical comments which follow should not be mis-
understood as overlooking so much of the discussion which is
sound and clear. At the beginning of the majority opinion, an
analysis is made of Article 803 of the Civil Code5 in the following
language:
"The first paragraph of that article deals with predial
servitudes, or real servitudes, that is to say, with servitudes
due to an estate, or a tract of land, as distinguished from
personal servitudes, or those which are due to persons....
The second paragraph of article 803 deals, specifically, with
personal servitudes, or those which are due to persons.""
This distinction cannot be accepted. While the article may
use language which refers to "persons," the context contem-
plates definitely and exclusively the predial servitudes. The use
of the word "persons" cannot be seized upon as an excuse for
relating the second paragraph of Article 803 to a so-called "per-
sonal servitude." The fact of the matter is that, while servitudes
are defined as constituting a relationship between estates,7 all
acts pertaining to the exercise of discontinuous servitudes" must
be performed by persons, as well as the establishment of those
facilities which might be necessary for the existence of continu-
ous servitudes. In none of these situations is there anything
which can be considered as changing the nature of the predial
servitude or as constituting a "personal servitude."
Furthermore, the actual illustration given in the second para-
graph of Article 803, namely the right of drawing water, is one
of the servitudes which the codifiers repeated several times to
illustrate the predial servitude.9
If a right of drawing water is stipulated in favor of a person
and is not related to a dominant estate, there is an enforceable
contract between the parties which creates a personal right but
4. Comment (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 534-540.
5. Art. 803, La. Civil Code of 1870. "When the estate to which the servi-
tude is due ceases to be undivided, by means of a partition, each of those
who were the coproprietors, only preserves the servitude by the use he
makes of it, and the others lose it by non-usage during the time required
for prescription.
"If a servitude be due to several persons, but on different days, as the
right of drawing water, he who does not exercise his right, loses it, and the
estate subject to the servitude becomes free from it, as respects him."
6. 34 So.(2d) 746, 749 (1946).
7. Art. 646 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
8. Art. 727, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. E.g., Arts. 711, 721, 727, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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which does not constitute a servitude at all under this title of the
Civil Code.
The present comments are in no way directed at the policy
decision reached by the court with reference to the regulation of
certain phases of mineral rights problems. However, it is like
switching horses in midstream to start by identifying the mineral
right as a personal servitude and then concluding by absolute
analogy to something which the code itself uses as an illustra-
tion of a predial servitude. As a matter of policy decision, no
comment is here made about the following statement:
"There is no difference, in the applicable principles of
law, between a servitude which gives to two or more persons
the right to draw water from the land of another and a servi-
tude which gives to two or more persons the right to take
the mineral oil or gas from the land of another."10
However, the idea is carried much too far in the further develop-
ments of this idea as follows:
"Nor is there any difference, in the applicable principles
of law, between the dividing of the advantage of such a
servitude by stipulating on what days each of the persons
to whom the servitude is due may exercise his right, and
dividing the advantage by stipulating the part of the land
on which each of the persons to whom the servitude is due
may exercise his right. Hence we may substitute, the words
"mineral oil or gas" for the word "water," and substitute the
words "different parts of the land" for the words "different
days," and thus paraphrase the second paragraph of Article
803 of the Civil Code, by saying that if a mineral servitude
be due to two or more persons, but on different parts of
the land that is subject to the servitude, he who does not
exercise his right to explore for the oil, gas or other minerals
in that part of the land on which he has the right loses it for
nonuse for the period of 10 years, and the land subject to
the servitude becomes free from it as respects him.""
In many parts of the various opinions written in these pres-
ent cases, reference is made to the fact that the articles on pred-
ial servitudes have been used wherever feasible for the decision
of mineral rights problems, by means of considering the mineral
right in the nature of a servitude. In the present case, if the
10. 34 So. (2d) 746, 750 (1946).
11. 34 So. (2d) 746, 750.
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opinion had merely supported its decision in favor of divisibility
by the principles in Article 803, that would have been a straight
policy determination. There was no need to try reading into the
code itself alien meanings which it does not contain and distinc-
tions which do not exist.
Revocation of Dedication of Street
Streets are usually planned at the time of the creation of
a new subdivision, and actual developments sometimes take un-
expected turns. In order to permit readjustments and the return
of dedicated areas into complete private ownership, the legisla-
ture has provided, as last expressed in Act 382 of 1938, for the
revocation by proper authorities of such dedications. In the case
of Caz-Perk Realty, Incorporated v. Police Jury of Parish of East
Baton Rouge,12 the plaintiff had created a new subdivision in
1921, with the recordation of a survey for the purpose of dedicat-
ing the streets and roads shown thereon. After the subdivision
had been developed, and as a result of one person having ac-
quired several lots as one consolidated estate, the roadway in
controversy was never improved or incorporated into the parish
system of roads. In 1942 the Police Jury of East Baton Rouge
officially revoked the dedication of the strip of road in question.
This action of the police jury was taken by virtue of the express
authority granted under Act 382 of 1938 when a street is aban-
doned or not necessary for public purposes. Since the action of
the police jury was so directly within the statutory authorization,
the contest and the bulky record could only have been directed
at the question of whether it had abused the power by acting
capriciously or arbitrarily. Although there was conflicting evi-
dence as to the necessity and usefulness of retaining the dedica-
tion, the court did not find sufficient basis to reject the police





For the ten-year acquisitive prescription, the Civil Code re-
quires possession coupled with good faith and just title.' Each of
these three elements has received extensive treatment by the
12. 213 La. 935, 35 So.(2d) 860 (1948).
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1. Art. 3478 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
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